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PaineWebber. Inc. et al v. Robertson Family Trust Case No. 20000043-SC
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Dear Ms. DfAlesandro:
Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees PaineWebber
Incorporated, Kidder, Peabody & Co. Incorporated and Francis Dunn Jr. (hereinafter the "Kidder
Parties") wish to bring to the Court's attention a recent case from the Utah Supreme Court which
is instructive for the above referenced appeal. That case is Reisbeck v. HCA Health Servs. of
Utah. 2000 Utah 48, 396 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 2000 Utah LEXIS 62 (2000). The Kidder Parties
cite Reisbeck in further support of their argument on pages 1 and 13 of their brief that the district
court is given broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for extension under Rule 4(e).
Reisbeck. 396 Utah Adv. at 26. The Kidder Parties also cite Reisbeck in support of their
argument on pages 10-11 of their brief that the district court's inquiry is an equitable one
requiring consideration of all relevant factors. Id. at 27. Finally, the Kidder Parties cite
Reisbeck for the proposition at pages 12-13 of their brief that the district court is entitled to give
significant consideration to the lack of any circumstances preventing the appellant from earlier
filing its brief. Id. For your convenience, a copy of the Reisbeck case is enclosed.
Very truly yours,
Snell & Wilmer

ayne
Enclosure
cc:

Brian W. Steffensen (w/endf
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Elizabeth REISBECK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH, INC, dba
HCA St. Mark's Hospital,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 981600
FILED: May 26, 2000
2000 UT 48
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J Dennis Frederick
ATTORNEYS:
Wayne A. Freestone, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
David W Slagle, Terence L. Rooney, Juhanne P
Blanch, Salt Lake City, for defendant
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
DURRANT, Justice:
^[1 Elizabeth Reisbeck appeals the district court's
denial of her motion for extension of time to file her
notice of appeal. In the underlying case, Reisbeck
sued HCA Health Services for malpractice and the
district court granted HCA's summary judgment.
Reisbeck's attorney mailed a notice of appeal, which
was filed by the clerk of the court four days after the
thirty-day deadline. The district court denied
Reisbeck's subsequent motion for extension of time to
file her appeal. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
^2 Reisbeck was injured when she fell from her
hospital bed. She sued HCA Health Services, alleging
medical malpractice. After conducting written
discovery and depositions, HCA moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment on May 26, 1998. Thereafter, Reisbeck's
attorney mailed a notice of appeal on Wednesday
June 24 That notice was filed by the clerk of the
Third District Court on Monday June 29, thirty-four
calendar days after entry ofjudgment.
P Upon discovering her notice of appeal had been
filed beyond the thirty-day deadline imposed by rule
4(a)1 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Reisbeck moved, pursuant to paragraph (e) of the
same rule, for an extension of time to appeal. In
support of the motion for an extension, Reisbeck's
attorney stated he had overlooked the fact that May
contains thirty-one days, and had consequently
calculated the deadline as falling on June 26th rather
than June 25th. He also had assumed that any
document would be received and filed not later than
two days after being mailed.
%4 The court denied Reisbeck's motion for extension
of tune. Reisbeck appeals that denial.
DISCUSSION
K5 Reisbeck concedes her notice of appeal was not
filed within thirty days, as required by rule 4(a) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Failure to file a
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timely notice of appeal depnves this court of
jurisdiction over the appeal. See Armstrong Rubber
Co v Bastion, 657 P 2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983);
Bowen v Rivenon City, 656 P 2d 434, 436 (Utah
1982). Paragraph (e) of the same rule 4 nevertheless
provides that
[t]he trial court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed
not later than 30 days after the expiration of
the tune prescribed by paragraph (a) of this
rule.
No extension shall exceed 30 days
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.
Utah R. App P 4(e) (emphasis added).
16 The trial court's discretion to grant or deny a rule
4(e) motion is very broad See West v Grand County,
942 P 2d 337,339-40 (Utah 1997). As we explained
in West:
[T]he question of whether any given set of
facts constitutes "excusable neglect" under
appellate rule 4(e) is highly fact dependent.
Moreover, the situations that might be
presented to a trial court under this rubric are
so varied and complex that "no rule
adequately addressing the relevance of all
these facts can be spelled out."
Id. (quoting State v Pena, 869 P 2d 932, 939 (Utah
1994)).
f7 Before the district court, Reisbeck argued that
her attorney had "good cause" for failing to ensure the
notice was timely filed, or alternatively, that her
attorney's failure was due to "excusable neglect"
Reisbeck asserted that the good cause criteria
promulgated by rule 4(e) provide a distinctly more
"liberal" standard than the excusable neglect criteria.
The parties bnefed and argued these issues, and the
trial court denied Reisbeck's motion for an extension
of tune for the "reasons specified m the opposing
memorandum."
f8 On appeal, Reisbeck recapitulates the arguments
she offered to the trial court and also asserts that the
trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard.
Specifically, she argues that this court's holding m
Murphyv Crosland,915P2d491,494(Utah 1996),
required the trial court to apply a good cause standard
instead of an excusable neglect standard. Because the
precise basis for the trial court's order is unclear and
because we deem it helpful to resolve ambiguity
surrounding the correct application of good cause
versus excusable neglect, we first address the
argument relating to the scope of applicability of
those standards.
%9 Murphy primarily treated the issue of whether
application of the excusable neglect standard or the
good cause standard depends on the timing of the
motion itself. Murphy acknowledged that the majority
of federal courts treating the federal counterpart to
Utah's rule 4(e) apply a more liberal good cause
standard only to those circumstances where a party
seeks an extension of tune before the initial time
penod forfilinga notice of appeal has expired. See id.
at 493. Conversely, the majority rule treats cases
under the rubric of excusable neglect where motions
for extensions are brought after the initial tune for
filing a notice has already expired. See id
f 10
Under the majority rule, excusable neglect
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and good cause are also subject to different analyses. contributed to, or provoked, a delay in filing was
Because application of the majority rule is governed genuinely beyond the moving party's control, that
by reference to the timing of the motion itself, it is factor will usually be more supportive of granting a
not surprising that the pre- deadline good cause motion to extend time than will a factor that is
standard invokes a more liberal treatment than the admittedly derived from the moving party's neglect.
post-deadline excusable neglect standard. Where a Nevertheless, because the assessment of the
party anticipates a need for more time to prepare a justifications offered by a moving party will remain
notice of appeal and notifies the trial court of the highly fact-intensive, see West, 942 P.2d at 339-40,
desire to extend the time before the deadline, that and because any given justification may entail aspects
party will usually be in a more sympathetic position both within and beyond the moving party's control, it
than the party who misses the deadline and then will often be difficult to label a particular justification
belatedly attempts to resurrect the opportunity to as being either purely related to good cause or purely
appeal.2
related to excusable neglect Many circumstances
^[11
Murphy concluded, however, that the legitimately may be treated under both rubrics. But
majority rule- which relied heavily on an apparent see Pontarelli, 930 F.2d at 110- 11 (holding two
misapplication of an advisory committee note to the standards do not overlap).
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-was not well f 15
In short, trial courts should treat each motion
reasoned. See id. at 493-94. Murphy instead opted for on its own merits, giving appropriate weight to the
a straightforward textual reading of rule 4(e) rather extent to which a particular justification relates to
than a policy-based distinction grounded in the timing factors within or beyond the party's control. To the
and nature of the motion filed. Since the rule plainly extent a particular justification implicates factors
states that the motion may be granted for either beyond the party's control, a more liberal good cause
excusable neglect or good cause, and because the rule standard should be applied. Conversely, where a party
does not draw any distinctions according to the or a party's attorney was concededly neglectful, the
timing of the motion, Murphy concluded that both court must determine whether that neglect should, on
excusable neglect and good cause could be invoked to balance, be excused. We reemphasize that the trial
support a motion for extension of time either before court's inquiry is fundamentally equitable in nature
or after expiration of the initial deadline. See id. at and entails broad discretion. Accordingly, we reaffirm
494.
West's refusal to establish any specific criteria for
^[12
Reisbeck argues the district court should determining good cause or excusable neglect in the
have applied a distinctly more liberal good cause specific context of motions for extension of time to
standard to her motion for extension of time to file file notice of appeal. See id.
Based on these principles and upon the
notice. Reisbeck's argument misapprehends the |16
consequences of our decision in Murphy. While it is deferential standard we apply in reviewing the trial
true that our holding in that case allows trial courts to court's grant or denial of a motion to extend time, we
assess rule 4(e) motions for both excusable neglect must affirm. In this case, Reisbeck's attorney offered
and good cause regardless of the timing of the two justifications for failing to meet the deadline for
motion, this does not mean moving parties may filing a notice of appeal. First, he miscalculated the
simply label their rule 4(e) motions under the rubric calendar date for the deadline, and second, he
they happen to prefer and then demand that the trial assumed that the postal service and Third District
court analyze them accordingly. If we accepted Court's clerk's office would work in concert to file the
Reisbeck's argument, we would effectively delete the notice within two business days of his sending it. The
term "excusable neglect" from rule 4 because all first factor simply constituted a mistake by Reisbeck's
moving parties would naturally prefer the good cause attorney. The second factor included elements beyond
standard for treatment oftheir motions to extend time. Reisbeck's attorney's control. Nevertheless, the timing
See Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. of postal delivery and court clerk's office filings are
not subject to absolute predictability. Regardless of
1991)
^[13
Murphy instead necessitates a more nuanced past experience, a delay of three or four days between
and flexible approach to application of good cause the mailing and filing of a court document should not
4
versus excusable neglect. Because Utah courts may have been wholly unexpected. The gravity of this
realization
should
have
been
augmented by
not rely on the simple expedient of the timing of the
motion itself for determining the governing standard, recognition of the severe consequence of missing the
the criteria must instead depend on the nature of the deadline. Failure to timely file a notice of appeal bars
justification offered to support the motion. By this jurisdiction in the appellate court. See Armstrong
standard, it is apparent rule 4(e) permits a trial court Rubber Co., 657 P.2d at 1348; Bowen, 656 P.2d at
to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal based 436. Moreover, Reisbeck's attorney has conceded
on two general categories of justification: (1) there was nothing particularly difficult or onerous
excusable neglect, which is an admittedly neglectful about preparation of the notice of appeal, nor were
delay that is nevertheless excused by special there any circumstances that would have prevented an
circumstances; or (2) good cause, which pertains to earlier filing. Although it appears that the neglect in
special circumstances that are essentially beyond a this case was not particularly egregious, the district
party's control? See, e.g., Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 court did not abuse its broad discretion m denying
F.2d 300, 301 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying good cause Reisbeck's motion for extension of time.
We affirm.
standard in case of unusually long delay between 117
mailing of notice and delivery by post office to clerk's
1fl8
Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice
office).
^14
Under this approach, good cause remains a Russon, Justice Durham, and Justice Wilkins concur
more liberal standard. To the extent a factor that in Justice Durrant's opinion.
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1 Rule 4(a), in pertinent part, provides as follows*
J
Appeal fromfinaljudgment and order In a case in
j
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right
I
from the trial court to the appellate court, the
j
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
I
from.
j
2 It is also not surprising that the term "good cause" appears j
more applicable to the situation where a motion is brought
before the deadline, while "excusable neglect" relates more
naturally to motions afterwards. If the motion is filed before 1
expiration of the deadline, a party will usually be arguing I
there is a positive justification for extending the deadline, I
whereas, if the deadline has already expired, the party must I
ask the court to excuse the default.
j
3 In this light, the question of whether a motion is brought I
before or after the deadline simply becomes one relevant j
factor m the flexible and discretionary balancing analysis
the trial court must undertake.
I
4 The fact that Reisbeck's attorney asserts that many pnor I
documents were received and filed within two business I
days does not materially alter the analysis. The examples [
provided by Reisbeck all relate to documents allegedly I
mailed on a Thursday or Friday, which were apparently all I
filed on the following Monday (or in one case Tuesday, I
where the intervening Monday was a holiday). The rules I
provide that where deadlines calculated according to
calendar days occur on a weekend or holiday, the filing date I
is deemed to fall on the first business day following the I
weekend or holiday See Utah R. App P 22. In this case, I
the deadline fell on a Thursday and the notice was mailed I
on a Wednesday.
I
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0)
and § 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether District Court Judge Sandra Peuler abused her discretion when she

considered all of the relevant facts and circumstances before her, concluded that the
Robertson Family Trust (the "Trust" had no excuse for its forty-five day delay in checking on
the status of the order before the court, and therefore denied the Trust's motion for an
extension time to file the appeal.
Whether facts presented warrant afindingof "excusable neglect" is a legal question
that is reviewed for correctness. West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997).
However, whether any given set of facts constitutes "excusable neglect" is highly fact
dependent. Id. Therefore, the trial court is given broad discretion in granting or denying
motions to extend the time for filing an appeal. Id. at 340. See also Prowswood, Inc. v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 1984) (phrasing issue as whether district
court "abused its discretion").
2.

Whether Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) entitled the Trust tofileits

motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal one hundred and thirty-two (132)
days after the appeal time had expired. Although the Kidder Parties raised this issue in the
trial court below, the court did not base its denial of the Trust's motion on this issue.
Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the trial court's decision denying the motion for an
extension on this alternate basis. Straub v. Fisher & Pavkel Health Care, 990 P.2d 384, 386
(Utah 1999); Mabus v. Blackstock. 994 P.2d 1272, 1275-76 (Utah Ct App. 1999).

3.

Whether Judge Peuler abused her discretion in denying defendant's motion to

reconsider.
Decisions granting or denying motions to reconsider are determined under an abuse of
discretion standard. In the Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to the Use of
All the Water, Both Surface and Underground. Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and
Jordan River. 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides:
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of
the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) provides:
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arises out of Judge Sandra Peuler5s denial of the Trust's motion for an
extension of time in which to file an appeal from the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor Paine Webber, Incorporated, Kidder,Peabody & Co. Incorporated and
Francis Dunn Jr. (hereinafter collectively the "Kidder Parties."). The Trust failed to file its
notice of appeal from the judgment within the thirty (30) days required by Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a). Thereafter, the Trust sought an extension of time in which to file a
notice of appeal. Judge Peuler found that the Trust had unreasonably delayed any effort to

determine whether and when the order on summary judgment had been entered and that the
Trust's neglect was not excusable. She therefore denied the motion for an extension and
subsequently denied the Trust's motion to reconsider. The Trust has appealedfromthese
rulings.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On or about March 10, 1998, the Trust submitted a Statement of Claim (the "Claim")
to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. alleging that the Kidder Parties had
recommended and sold inappropriate securities to the Trust in 1981. Upon receiving the
Statement of Claim, on or about October 7,1998, the Kidder Parties filed an action in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County seeking a determination that the Trust's claims were
untimely and not subject to arbitration. The Kidder Parties simultaneously moved for an
order staying the NASD arbitration, which motion was granted on November 17, 1998. On
November 12,1998, the Kidder Parties moved for Summary Judgment on the basis that the
Trust's claims were time barred and, therefore, not arbitrable. On January 12,1998, the court
mailed a minute entry to the parties granting the Kidder Parties motion for summary
judgment. The court entered a formal order on February 8, 1999.
The Trust filed an untimely notice of appeal on March 10, 1999. The Trust failed to
pay the required filing fee upon filing its notice. On March 18, 1999, the Trust filed an
amended notice of appeal with the required fee. On April 23, 1999, the Kidder Parties moved
for summary disposition on the basis that the appeal was untimely. On June 1, 1999, the Utah
Supreme Court granted the Kidder Parties' motion for summary disposition and remanded the
case to the trial court, concluding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
Trust's untimely appeal.

On June 23, 1999, the Trust filed an untimely motion for an extension of time in
which to file a notice of appeal. The district court denied the Trust's motion on September 8,
1999. On September 13, 1999, the Trust filed a motion to reconsider which the district court
also denied on December 8,1999. The Trust thenfiledthe instant appeal on January 6, 2000.
Statement of Relevant Facts
In its Statement of Facts, the Trust sets forth five pages of disputed allegations
regarding its underlying claims in the arbitration. Because those facts have nothing to do with
the issues on appeal, the Kidder Parties will spend no time addressing those facts. The only
facts which are relevant to this appeal are the facts surrounding the Trust's untimely notice of
appeal. Those facts are as follows:
1.

On November 12, 1998, the Kidder Parties filed their motion for summary

judgment, seeking a determination that the Trust's claims were ineligible for arbitration
because the events giving rise to the claims occurred in 1981, over sixteen year prior to the
Trust's filing of its Statement of Claim. (R. 71-98).
2.

On December 21, 1998, after receiving the Trust's opposing motion, the

Kidder Parties filed their reply memorandum which completed briefing on the motion for
summary judgment. (R. 135-152). The Kidder Parties also filed a notice to submit the
motion for decision. (R. 157-159).
3.

On January 11,1999, District Court Judge Dennis M. Fuchs granted the

Kidder Parties' motion for summary judgment. Judge Fuchs prepared and entered a Minute
Entry granting the motion. The Minute Entry was mailed to each party on January 12,1999
and instructed the Kidder Parties to prepare the order. (R. 167-169).

4.

On or about January 22, 1999, the Kidder Parties submitted to the court their

proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment Granting Summary
Judgment. (R. 177-181)
5.

The Trust was aware on or about January 23, 1999, that the Kidder Parties'

proposed order had been submitted to the court. (R. 232-234).
6.

On February 3,1999, defendant submitted an untimely objection to the Kidder

Parties' proposed order challenging two minor points in the order. (R. 170-173).
7.

On February 8,1999, Judge Dennis Fuchs signed plaintiffs proposed order

and entered final judgment. (R. 177-181).
8.

On March 9, approximatelyfifty-seven(57) days after receiving the court's

Minute Entry granting summary judgment, approximately forty-five (45) days after it learned
that the proposed order had been submitted to the district court, and approximately thirty-four
(34) days after the Trust submitted its own objection to the proposed order, the Trust made its
first inquiry to the district court about the status of the order. (R. 232-234).
9.

The Trust evidently did not bother to obtain a copy of the signed order before

filing its notice of appeal. (R. 217).
10.

On March 11, 1999, thirty-one (31) days after entry of thefinaljudgment, the

Trust filed itsfirstNotice of Appeal. (R. 182-184)
11.

The Trust did not pay the filing fee required by Rule 3(f) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure at the time it filed the Notice of Appeal. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal
could not be docketed. (R. 203)
12.

On March 18, 1999, the district court clerk informed the Trust that the Notice

of Appeal could not be docketed without the appropriate filing fee. (R. 203).

13.

On March 18,1999, the Trust filed an Amended Notice of Appeal with the

appropriate filing fee. (R. 185-187).
14.

On April 23, 1999, the Kidder Parties filed a Motion for Summary Disposition

on the basis that the Trust's appeal was not timely filed.
15.

On June 1, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court granted the Kidder Parties' motion

for summary disposition. (R. 220-221)
16.

On June 23,1999, the Trust filed its motion to extend the time for filing a

notice of appeal arguing excusable neglect due to misinformation received from the court
clerk on March 9,1999. (R. 197-212)
17.

On June 30,1999, the Kidder Parties opposed the Trust's motion for an

extension arguing that the motion was untimely and arguing that the Trust's failure to check
with the court for forty-five (45) days after the proposed order had been submitted to the
court, together with its failure to file obtain a copy of the order before filing its notice of
appeal and its failure to file the notice of appeal with the appropriate filing fee, constituted
neglect and was without excuse. (R. 214-219).
18.

In a minute entry dated August 30,1999, and in her ultimate order dated

September 9, 1999, District Court Judge Sandra Peuler agreed with the Kidder Parties'
analysis of the facts and denied the Trust's motion for an extension. (R. 232-234; 235-237).
19.

On September 13,1999, the Trust filed its motion to reconsider making exactly

the same arguments that it had made in its original motion for an extension. (R. 238-244).
20.
(R. 264-266).

On December 8, 1999, Judge Peuler denied the Trust's motion to reconsider.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trust consistently has failed to recognize the basis for Judge Peuler's denial of its
motion to extend the time for filing an appeal. The basis for that ruling has nothing
whatsoever to do with the misinformation that the Trust may have received on March 9,1999.
Rather, Judge Peuler's decision was based upon the fact that the Trust waited until March 9,
1999, to make its first inquiry of the court regarding the status of the order on summary
judgment, forty-five (45) days after the order had been submitted to the court for signature.
The court recognized that it was merely fortuitous that the appeal period had not run on the
day the Trust finally made its inquiry. When the Trust finally made the call to the court and
learned that expiration of the appeal period was imminent, it did not bother to obtain a copy of
the order but waited an additional two days and then filed its notice of appeal—without the
required filing fee. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate whether the Trust's
actions constituted excusable neglect. Judge Peuler should be given broad discretion in her
weighing of the facts, in her consideration of the equities and ultimately, in her decision to
deny the motion for an extension. This Court should affirm Judge Peuler's decision.
The denial of the Trust's motion for an extension may also be affirmed on the basis
that the Trust failed to timely file its motion within thirty (30) days of the expiration of the
time for filing its notice of appeal as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e).
The trust's motion to reconsider simply presented the district court with the same
arguments that were made in its original motion for an extension of time. Judge Peuler
appropriately exercised her discretion in denying the motion to reconsider. This Court should
affirm the district court order denying the motion to reconsider.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE TRUST'S
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING AN APPEAL
A.

The Trust's Inexcusable Neglect in Timely Pursuing Its Appeal Did
Not Entitle It to an Extension of Time to File that Appeal.

In its brief, the Trust focuses its analysis entirely upon the alleged misinformation that
it received from the district court on March 9,1999, the 29th day of the appeal period
(Appellant's Brief, p. 19). The Trust fails to address, or for that matter even to acknowledge,
the actual basis for the district court's ruling. Judge Sandra Peuler did not base her decision
on anything that happened on March 9,1999. Rather, she based her ruling upon the fact that
the Trust made no effort prior to March 9,1999 to determine the status of the order on
summary judgment. (R. 232-234; 235-237). It was this neglect and delay that Judge Peuler
found to be inexcusable and these facts which led her to deny the Trust's request for an
extension of time to file an appeal.
Utah Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides as follows: "In a
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall befiledwith the clerk of the trial court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App.
P. 4(a). The failure to file a timely appeal under Rule 4(a) creates a jurisdictional bar to the
appeal. See Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Rule
4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides some relief from the jurisdictional bar
in certain very limited circumstances. Rule 4(e) provides: "The trial court, upon a showing
of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a

motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a)
of this rule." Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen the question of "excusable
neglect' arises in a jurisdictional context (e.g. Utah R. Civ. P. 73(a))1 . . . the standard
contemplated thereby is necessarily a strict one," Prowswood v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,
676 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 1984). The intent of the "excusable neglect" provision in Rule 4(e)
is "to take care of emergency situations only." Id at 960 (quoting R. Stern, Changes in the
Federal Appellate Rules, 41 F.R.D. 297, 299 (analyzing comparable Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)).
The rule "was not intended to permit an extension 'in the absence of circumstances that are
unique or extraordinary." Id. (quoting Maryland Casualty Company v. Conner, 382 F.2d 13,
16-17 (10th Cir. 1967)(analyzing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)).
As the Trust correctly recognizes, the Utah Supreme Court and other courts have
articulated four factors for consideration in determining "excusable neglect." West v. Grand
County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). Those factors are "[i] the danger of prejudice to [the
nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings,
[iii] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the
movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 340-341 (quoting City of
Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co. 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994)). These four
factors, though important, "are not dispositive, but rather, helpful. IdL at 341. Of the four
factors articulated, "fault in the delay remains a very important factor—perhaps the most
important factor—in determining whether neglect is excusable." Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046.
1

Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was the predecessor to Rule 4 of the Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure. Both rules included a 30 day appeal period and the possibility
for an extension of time based upon a finding of "excusable neglect." Utah R. App. P. (4)(a)
& (e). Thus, the same analysis of "excusable neglect" that applied to Rule 73(a) in
Prowswood, applies to "excusable neglect" in the current Rule 4(e).

Courts must remember that "the question of whether [an appellant's] conduct is
excusable is an equitable one, and such determination should take into account all relevant
circumstances surrounding the party's neglect." West, 942 P.2d at 340 (citing Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc, 507 U.S. 380,395 (1993) ("the determination is at bottom an
equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's
omission."). The court must also remember that one who "seeks equity must itself do equity."
Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah Ct App. 1989) (quoting Horton v. Horton, 695
P.2d 102,107 (Utah 1984)). See also Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572,577 (Utah 1999) ("a
party seeking equity must do so with clean hands") (quoting LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753
P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988)).
Contrary to the Trust's assertions, Judge Peuler properly and appropriately considered
and applied all of the foregoing considerations in her analysis of "excusable neglect." She
declined to find that the facts before her presented an emergency situation or that the
circumstances were so unique and extraordinary as to justify a finding of "excusable neglect."
She declined to focus solely upon the phone call of March 9, 1999, and instead, took into
consideration all of the circumstances surrounding the Trust's neglect in this case. She
recognized that although the length of the delay, the prejudice to the Kidder Parties' and the
Trust's good faith were all factors to consider, those factors were outweighed by the
defendant's unexplained and inexcusable delay and failure timely to check on the status of the
order.2 She recognized that before the Trust was entitled to take advantage of the
2

Curiously, the Trust finds fault with Judge Peuler's finding that "defendant's delay in
checking with the Court and timely filing its appeal does not appear to have been beyond the
control of the defendant." (R. 232). The language used by Judge Peuler in this finding is
taken nearly verbatim from the West case and is one of the four factors that the court was
required to consider in making its decision. West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah
1997). The finding was simply one of Judge Peuler's several findings and an appropriate
issue for consideration.
10

misinformation that it may have received on March 9, 1999, it was obligated to demonstrate
that its actions in seeking a timely appeal were otherwise appropriate. This the Trust could
not, and did not, do.
The critical, undisputed, facts before the court were these: 1) the Trust knew by
January 11, 1999 that the district court had granted summary judgment; 2) the Trust knew on
January 23, 1999 that a proposed order had been submitted to the district court for signature;
3) the Trust itself had submitted an objection to the proposed order by February 3, 1999; and,
4) the Trust nevertheless waited until March 9,1999, to make its first inquiry to the court—45
days from submission of the proposed order and 34 days from the submission of its own
objection. (R.232-234; 235-237). Judge Peuler specifically relied upon the foregoing facts in
her order denying the motion for an extension Id. The court also had a number of additional
undisputed facts before it which could have supported Judge Peuler's decision to deny the
motion. Those facts include: that the Trust made a single phone call regarding the order and
neglected to obtain a copy of the order from the court to confirm the date of entry of the order;
that the Trust, despite its knowledge of the imminence of the appeal cut-off deadline, waited
an additional two days before filing its notice; and, that when the Trust finally filed its notice
of appeal, it neglected to pay the filing fee required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
3(f).3 (R. 202-204). All of these facts, taken together, clearly justified the Judge Peuler's
decision to deny the Trust's equitable motion for an extension.
The Utah Supreme Court case of Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676
P.2d 952 (1984) is particularly instructive here. In Prowswood the defendant prevailed on the
merits. Prowswood then prepared a notice of appeal and sent it to the court for filing by a
3

The failure to file the fee did not automatically invalidate the appeal. However, the failure
to file the fee is sufficient grounds for dismissal of an appeal by tins Court under appropriate

runner who neglected to pay thefilingfee. Id. at 954.4 The next day, still within the thirty
(30) day appeal period, Prowswood contacted the court clerk for an assurance that the appeal
had been properly filed. Id. at 957 The clerk allegedly informed the appellant that the appeal
had been properly filed and neglected to mention that thefilingfee had not been paid. Id.
Thereafter, after the appeal time had expired, the district court notified the appellant that the
fee had not been paid. Id. at 954. Appellant then immediately moved for an extension of time
in which to properly file its appeal which was granted by the district court upon afindingof
excusable neglect. Id. Mountain Fuel appealed this decision of the district court.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court declined to find "excusable neglect" and reversed
the decision of district court. Id. at 961. The Court noted that "the oversight and inadvertence
of counsel in this case preceded and occurred wholly independently of the purported error of
the deputy court clerk." IcL Therefore, Prowswood could not rely upon the clerk's error to
excuse its own neglect Id.
The instant case is analogous to Prowswood. Here, the Trust neglected for forty-five
(45) days after the submission of the proposed order to check on the status of that order. Had
the trust diligently monitored the status of the order, it could easily have filed a timely appeal.
Moreover, had the proposed order been signed by Judge Fuchs at any time within the fifteen
days after its submission to the court, the Trust's belated call on March 9,1999, would have
circumstances. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Thus, it would have been appropriate for the
district
court to factor that failure into its analysis of the Trust's inexcusable neglect.
4
Prowswood was decided under former Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
which provided that an appeal was invalid unless a notice of appeal was timely filed along
with the proper fee. Subsequent to Prowswood, the Utah Supreme Court replaced Rule 73(a)
with Rules 3 and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 3(a) diverged from
former Rule 73(a) in that "the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court is
no longer jurisdictional." Dipoma v. McPhic 2000 Utah 130, P14, 200 Utah App. LEXIS 44,
12, 394 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (2000) (quoting State v. Johnson. 700 P.2d 1125, 1129 n.l (Utah
1985). Although Rule 3(a) changed the analysis of Prowswood with respect to the
jursdictional nature of filing fees, the fundamental "excusable neglect" analysis in Prowswood
remains good law.
1?

been too late. It was merely fortuitous for the Trust that the appeal period had not run on
March 9, 1999, when it finally made its call. Upon learning that the order had been signed,
the Trust then compounded its neglect by failing promptly to obtain a copy of the signed order
which would have demonstrated the filing date. The Trust then waited two more days to file
notice of appeal and then filed the notice without the required fee. As was the case in
Prowswood. the alleged misinformation received from the clerk on March 9, 1999, did not
excuse the neglectful conduct by the Trust up to and after that telephone call.
As the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated, Judge Peuler is "given broad discretion
in granting or denying motions to extend the time for filing an appeal." West v. Grand
County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). See also Prowswood, 676 P.2d at 959 (the question
is whether the district court "abused its discretion"). Judge Peuler did not abuse her discretion
in this case. She properly considered the Trust's conduct and the equities in the case and
denied the Trust's motion for an extension. This Court should affirm that decision.

B.

The Unique Circumstances Doctrine Does Not Save the Trust's
Untimely Appeal.

As it did in its "excusable neglect" argument, the Trust focuses solely upon the March
9, 1999 telephone call with the court clerk. The Trust completely ignores all of the other
circumstances and equities which led the trial court to deny the Trust's motion for an
extension.
The Utah Supreme Court recently referenced the "unique circumstances" doctrine in
West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 341 (Utah 1997). The Court recognized that "[i]f the
district court induced detrimental reliance by the appellant resulting in the filing of an
untimely notice of appeal, we may allow the appeal in the best interests of justice' given such

unique circumstances." Id, ("emphasis added) (quoting Senjo v. Murray, 943 F.2d 36, 37
(10th Cir. 1991) (per curium)). The West decision makes two important points. First, the
court's decision to allow an appeal is permissive, not mandatory. Second, the appeal should
only be allowed where it is "in the best interest ofjustice." Judge Peuler concluded that the
granting the extension here was not in the best interests of justice.
The facts in West are also instructive. In West, the appellant argued that it was typical
for the trial court to delay for six-months before issuing and entering orders in her case. Id.
Therefore, she argued, the court's practice had lulled her into inaction resulting in her failure
to learn that the order had been entered until after the appeal period had expired. Id at 340.
The Court declined to hold that the district court's practice was "a per se excuse for trial
counsel's failure to fulfill the duty to check with the clerk periodically to determine whether
orders [had] been entered." IcL at 341. That practice was merely a factor for the trial court to
consider on remand. Id
Here, as in West, the action of the court which allegedly produced detrimental reliance
by the Trust was merely a factor for the trial court to consider in its Rule 4(e) analysis. The
Trust presented the facts of the alleged March 9, 1999 telephone call to Judge Peuler. Judge
Peuler was not persuaded that the March 9, 1999 call excused the Trust's failure to timely file
its appeal. Judge Peuler recognized, as did the Court in West, that the Trust had a duty "to
check with the clerk periodically to determine whether orders [had] been entered." Id. at 341.
It was this duty, and the neglect of that duty until March 9, 1999, that led Judge Peuler to
deny the Trust's motion.
The only case relied upon by the Trust in its "unique circumstances" analysis is the
Eleventh Circuit case of Pinion v. Dow Chemical 928 F.2d 1522,15323 (11th Cir. 1991).

The Trust cites Pinion for a basic principle of law. The Trust does not arguefromthe facts in
Pinion because the facts are not analogous to this case. It does not rely upon the holding of
Pinion because the Eleventh Circuit declined to find "unique circumstances" in that case. The
Trust quotes only one paragraph from Pinion and ignores other paragraphs which are equally
important. For example, Pinion recognized that the "unique circumstances" doctrine "is an
equitable doctrine that enables [the court] to consider all the relevant circumstances in
deciding whether to exercise the power that [it has]." Id The Court also noted that the
doctrine is a "narrowly construed equitable exception." IcL at 1534.
For all of the reasons previously given, the facts and the equities in this case do not
justify the application of this narrowly drawn "unique circumstances" exception. Judge
Peuler, who was in the best position to weigh those facts and equities, and who is given broad
discretion to grant or deny a motion for an extension, properly denied the Trust's motion in
this case. This Court should affirm Judge Peuler's decision.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION MAY BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE THE TRUST'S MOTION TO EXTEND WAS UNTIMELY.

In opposing the Trust's motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, the
Kidder Parties argued that the motion to extend was untimely and that the trust's neglect in
failing to file a timely appeal was without excuse. (R. 214-219). Judge Peuler was persuaded
by the Kidder Parties' second argument and denied the motion on that basis. She did not base
her decision on the fact that the motion to extend was untimely. However, this Court may
affirm the on any proper ground presented to the district court. See, Straub v. Fisher &
Pavkel Health Care. 990 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1999); Mabus v. Blackstock. 994 P.2d 1272,
1275-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).

Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly and specifically requires
that a motion to extend be "filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule." Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (emphasis added). The
District Court entered its final order on February 8,1999. The time prescribed by Rule 4(a)
for the Trust to file its appeal expired on March 10,1999. Pursuant to Rule 4(e), the Trust
was required to file its motion for an extension within the following thirty (30) days, or by
April 9, 1999. The Trust did not file its motion for extension of time until June 22, 1999, one
hundred and thirty-two (132) days after the time for filing the appeal expired. The Trust's
motion was untimely and this Court may affirm the district court's denial of the motion on
that basis.
IBL

THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY DENIED THE TRUST'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER.

In its motion to reconsider, the Trust relied upon the same facts, and made the same
arguments, that were presented to the court in connection with its motion for an extension of
time. Judge Peuler continued to find those facts and arguments unpersuasive. If this Court
affirms Judge Peuler's denial of the motion for an extension, it must similarly deny the
motion to reconsider.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Kidder Parties respectfully request this Court to
affirm the district court's denial of the Trust's motion for an extension of time to file an
appeal and motion for reconsideration

DATED this 6th day of June, 2000.
SNELL & WILMER
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PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY &
CO. INC., a Delaware corporation
and VAN FRANCIS DUNN, JR. , an
individual,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

980910104

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,
Defendant.

Defendant has had an opportunity to conduct discovery and an
open invitation from plaintiff to request any documents they needed
and defendant has failed to request documents. The Court therefore
denies defendant's request to stay the determination of Summary
Judgment pending further discovery.
There still being no written agreement for arbitration, the
Court finds the Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for decision
and finds that the Court has jurisdiction over the issue of
arbitration as per the argument of plaintiff and ruling of the
Court granting the temporary stay of arbitration.
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The Court finds that if the NASD is interpreted as a statute
of repose, the six year limitation started running 1981. However,
even if the Court should consider the NASD rule as a statute of
limitations and as per the argument of defense that the discovery
rule should apply, the Court would find that the Robertson Trust
was put on notice long before 1992 that there were significant
problems with, the investment. Defendant should have been on notice
from approximately 1984 forward.

The Court finds that with any

kind of diligent investigation on the part of defendant he would
have discovered the problems.
For the foregoing reasons and the additional argument as
contained in plaintiff's Memorandum, the Court finds that the
action

is time barred and hereby grants plaintiff's Motion.

Plaintiff is to prepare the Order.
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XN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER PEABO&Y & CO.,
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. 980910104

vs.

Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's request for a Rule
56(f) continuance were fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the Court for decision.
The Court, having reviewed all of the motions, memoranda, affidavits and other evidence
submitted by the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, finds, concludes and orders as
follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiffs presented the following material facts in support of their motion for summary
judgment Defendants produced no evidence to dispute these facts:
1.

In 1981, plaintiffs assisted James L. Robertson with the purchase of an interest in

Lauren Plaza Associates, Ltd ("Lauren Plaza") which owned and operated a shopping center.
2.

Plaintiffs and Mr. Robertson did not enter into a written agreement between them

relating to the Lauren Plaza investment or relating to any other matter.
3.

There was no further interaction between plaintiffs and defendant after 1981.

4.

Defendant claims that James L. Robertson purchased the Lauren Plaza Investment

based upon plaintiffs' erroneous investment advice and that the advice was erroneous 1) because
James L. Robertson was not in a 50% tax bracket in or after 1981; 2) because the shares were not
easily transferrable, there being no market for the shares; 3) because the shopping center was not
sold within five years resulting in a quick profit; and 4) because Lauren Plaza was not the safest
possible investment.
5.

In 1984, Balcor, the general partner of Lauren Plaza, told Mr. Robertson that

there were no plans to sell the shopping center. This information concerned Mr. Robertson
because he had understood from the investment advise that the shopping center would be sold
within five years of 1981, resulting in a substantial profit to investors in Lauren Plaza.
6.

In 1986, Balcor told Mr. Robertson that there were no plans to sell the shopping

center and that problems had developed.
7.

In every Lauren Plaza annual report after 1986, Balcor reported problems.

2

8,

In 1991, Balcor informed Mr. Robertson that the partnership planned to hold the

shopping center for another two to three years if the partnership could negotiate a loan
modification.
9.

Defendant ignored plaintiffs' invitation to request any documentation that it

believed would be helpful to oppose plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Defendant has
not attempted to do any formal or informal discovery in this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction to consider the eligibility of defendant's claims for

arbitration under Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. Cogswell v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1996).
2.

Defendant is not entitled to a Rule 56(f) continuance because it has neglected to

do any formal or informal discovery to date, has failed to explain why it cannot present sufficient
evidence to support its opposition, Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987), and has failed to "explain how the requested continuance will aid [its] opposition to
summary judgment." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
3.

Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provides a substantive

limit on claims that may be submitted to arbitration in the nature of a statute of repose. Cogswell
v, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 479 (10th Cir. 1996). CIRaithaus
v. Saah-Scandia of America, Tnc, 784 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1989). Thus, defendant's claims
became ineligible for arbitration in 1987, six years from the date that James Robertson purchased
his investment in Lauren Plaza.

3

4.

Even if Rule 10304 is construed to be a statute of limitations, defendant's claims

were barred no later than 1990. James Robertson discovered, or would have discovered through
any kind of diligent investigation, that his investment had serious problems beginning in 1984.
The limitations period began to run upon first learning of his legal injury in 1984, not upon
learning of the full extent of his damages in 1992. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99-100 (Utah
1982).
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
The Court, having carefully considered the arguments for and against the motion for
summary judgment and the request for a Rule 56(f) continuance, and the Court having
announced its decisions regarding the motion and request in a minute entry dated January 11,
1999, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

Defendants request for a Rule 56(f) continuance is denied.

3.

NASD arbitration proceeding, Case No. 98-00981, is permanently stayed.

4.

Defendant is permanently enjoined from seeking to arbitrate any claims against

plaintiffs that are based upon events and occurrences that took place more than six years prior to
the date of this order.

4

MADE AND ENTERED this /

day of February, 1999.

, '

BY THE COURT

If
DENNIS M^UCHS
Third JudiciaTfJ5stoctj3p^P'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY &
CO. INC., a Delaware corporation
and VAN FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an
individual,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

980910104

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,
Defendant.

Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on
defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of
Appeal.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed in this

matter, now enters the following ruling.
The defendant's Motion for Extension of Time is denied.
Defendant's failure to timely file its appeal is not excusable
neglect.

Although it appears that the late filing does not

prejudice plaintiff, nor was the length of delay substantial, and
further while there is no evidence that the movant acted in bad
faith, it appears to the Court that the reason for delay was not
beyond the control of the movant.

As pointed out by plaintiff,

defendant knew that the Court had granted Summary Judgment on or
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about January 11, 1999.
January

MINUTE ENTRY

Further, the defendant knew on or about

23 that plaintiff had submitted

its proposed

Order.

Defendant's failure to check with the clerk for a period in excess
of 30 days to see whether an Order had been entered was neglect,
but is not excusable.

Based upon that, the defendant's Motion is

denied.
Counsel

for

plaintiff

is directed

to prepare

an

Order

consistent with this ruling.
Dated this

^°

day of August, 1999.

SANDRA N. PE
DISTRICT COURTX^JUDG,

*&*~264?/
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Third Judicial District
Robert W. Payne (5334)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)237-1900
Facsimile: (801)237-1950
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 980910104
vs.

Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal came
regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on August 30, 1999. The Court, having
reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by the parties and having announced its
decision regarding the motion in a minute entry, and good cause appearing therefor,
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows:
A.
1999.

Defendant knew that the Court had grant Summary Judgment on or about July 11,

B.

Defendant knew that plaintiff had submitted a proposed Order on summary

judgment on or about January 23, 1999.
C.

Despite this knowledge, defendant failed to check with the clerk for a period in

excess of thirty (30) days to see whether the order had been executed by the Court.
D.

Although the late filing does not appear to have prejudice the plaintiff, the length

of delay was not substantial, and there is no evidence that defendant acted in bad faith,
defendant's delay in checking with the Court and timely filing its appeal does not appear to have
been beyond the control of the defendant.
E.

Defendant's delay for more than thirty (30) days to see whether the Court had

entered the proposed order was neglect.
F.

Defendant's neglect in failing to timely file its appeal is not excusable.

Therefore, THE COURT ORDERS as follows:
Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal is hereby
denied.
MADE AND ENTERED this °j day of September, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

§ANDRAN.P!
Third Judicial D!
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Brian W. Steffensen
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I hereby certify that on the 1st day of September, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by regular mail, via United States Postal
Service, postage prepaid, on the following:
Brian W. Steffensen

STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C (3092)
Steff ensen • McDonald • Steffensen
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Tel: (801)485-3707
Fax: (801) 485-7140

qq <;rp | q rn :<->• ic

Attorney for Defendant the Robertson Family Trust

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,
Defendant.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION RE THEIR
MOTION FOR
AN EXTENSION OF TTME IN WHICH
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL
AND OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
ORDER
And Request for Hearing

Civil No. 980910104
Judge Sandra Peuler (originally assigned to
Judge Fuchs and reassigned to Judge Peuler)

In issuing its ruling on Defendants' Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File
Ndtice of Appeal, the Court based its denial of said motion on the erroneous assumption of fact
that Defendants had not inquired as to the execution of the order within the thirty (30) day
appeal time period — and ruled that this was not "excusable neglect."
The true facts are, as outlined in the attached affidavit which was filed with the Utah

Supreme Court, as follows:
L

Defendants counsel inquired as to the execution of the order on or about March 9, 1999 —
the 29th day.

2.

A Clerk of Court told Defendants' counsel that the order had been executed on February
10, 1999. This was in error, but Defendants' counsel relied upon it.

3.

The Notice of Appeal was drafted and staff instructed to file it on March 10, 1999.
However, thinking that there was no rush, the Notice of Appeal was not actually filed
with the Court until the next day, March 11, 1999.

Since the true facts are that Defendants did inquire as to the date of execution within the thirty
day time period, but were given inaccurate information which caused them to miss the deadline
by a single day, Defendants respectfully request that the Court reconsider its denial of the Motion
for Extension. The actions of Defendants in these regards constituted excusable neglect and
justice and equity demand that they be allowed to proceed with their appeal.
These facts, plus the case law cited in Defendants moving papers, support the granting of
the motion in question.
Defendants object to the proposed Order being signed until their Motion for
Reconsideration is resolved.
Defendants request a hearing on their Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED this / j ^ d a y of September, 1999.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

41day of_ -S&2

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this /
1999, via the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to:

Bryon J. Benevento
Robert W. Payne
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Robert W. Payne (5334)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)237-1900
Facsimile: (801)237-1950
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY & CO.
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER
Case No. 980910104

Plaintiffs,

Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
vs.

The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration re their Motion for an Extension of Time in
Which to File Notice of Appeal came regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on
November

, 1999. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by

the parties, and good cause appearing therefor,
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows:

A.

Defendant did not submit a timely objection to defendants' proposed Order

Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal as permitted by Rule
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
B.

On September 9, 1999, the Court entered its Order Denying Motion for Extension

of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal.
C.

On September 13, 1999, plaintiff submitted a Motion for Reconsideration re their

Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal.
D.

Motions to reconsider are not provided for under the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure and have never been recognized as a proper motion in this state.
E.

The arguments set forth in plaintiffs motion to reconsider are not persuasive.

THEREFORE, the Court declines plaintiffs invitation to reconsider its September 9,
1999, Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal.
MADE AND ENTERED this J[_ day of Noyfember, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

SANDRA N.
Third Judicial
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of November, 1999,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER to
be served, via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, on the following:

Brian W. Steffensen

STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C (3092)
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Tel: (801) 485-3707
Fax: (801) 485-7140
Attorney for Defendants the Robertson Family Trust and James L. Robertson

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual,

DEFENDANTS'
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 980910104

The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,

Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

Defendant.

Notice is hereby given that the defendants/appellants Robertson Family Trust and James L.
Robertson, by and through their attorney of Record, Brian W. Steffensen, appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals all orders and rulings in this action, including the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order entered on February 10, 1999, by the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Third

Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The appeal is taken from
entirety of all orders and rulings entered by the Court in this action, including, but not limited to,
the entire Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
DATED this JD_ Day of March, 1999.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this \\
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Bryon J. Benevento
Robert W. Payne
SNELL & WELMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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day

Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092)
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Tel: (801) 485-3707
Fax: (801) 485-7140
Attorneyfor Defendants the Robertson Family Trust and James L. Robertson

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO.,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN
FRANCIS DUNN, JR, an individual,

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 980910104

The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON,
Trustee,

Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

Defendant.

Notice is hereby given that the defendants/appellants Robertson Family Trust and James L.
Robertson, by and through their attorney of Record, Brian W. Steffensen, appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals all orders and rulings in this action, including the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order entered on February 10,1999, by the Honorable Dennis M.

Fuchs, Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The appeal is
takenfromentirety of all orders and rulings entered by the Court in this action, including, but not
limited to, the entire Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
DATED this / ^ Day of March, 1999.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this

jit

the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Bryon J. Benevento
Robert W. Payne
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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day of March, 1999, via

